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We extend in a minimal way the stylized macroeconomic Agent-Based model introduced in our
previous paper [1], with the aim of investigating the role and efficacy of monetary policy of a ‘Central
Bank’ that sets the interest rate such as to steer the economy towards a prescribed inflation and
employment level. Our major finding is that provided its policy is not too aggressive (in a sense
detailed in the paper) the Central Bank is successful in achieving its goals. However, the existence of
different equilibrium states of the economy, separated by phase boundaries (or “dark corners”), can
cause the monetary policy itself to trigger instabilities and be counter-productive. In other words,
the Central Bank must navigate in a narrow window: too little is not enough, too much leads to
instabilities and wildly oscillating economies. This conclusion strongly contrasts with the prediction
of DSGE models.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
The Agent Based Model (ABM) studied in this paper is a generalization of the “toy-ABM” (dubbed Mark-0)
recently introduced in [1], following previous work by the group of Delli Gatti et al. [2]. Mark-0 considers a stylized
economy with firms and households, but no banks, no interest rates on loans and deposits, and therefore no direct
concept of “monetary policy”. As discussed at length in [1], the original motivation of Mark-0 was mostly to illustrate
the importance of phase diagrams and phase transitions in the context of ABMs, in particular the sensitivity of the
state of the (artificial) economy on a subset of parameters. Small changes in the value of these parameters were indeed
found to induce sharp variations in aggregate output, unemployment or inflation. In other words, endogenous crises
can occur in such economies, as the result of insignificant or anecdotal changes in the environment. This possibility
is quite interesting in itself, and must be contrasted with more traditional economic models, such as the popular
DSGE framework [3, 4], where the dynamics is linear and only large exogenous shocks can cause havoc. As recently
pointed out by O. Blanchard in a very inspiring piece [5]: We in the field did think of the economy as roughly linear,
constantly subject to different shocks, constantly fluctuating, but naturally returning to its steady state over time. [...].
The main lesson of the crisis is that we were much closer to “dark corners” – situations in which the economy could
badly malfunction – than we thought.
Because they can deal with non-linearities, heterogeneities and crises, ABMs are often promoted as possible al-
ternatives to the DSGE models used in central banks as guides for monetary policy [4, 6–8]. It is therefore clear
that introducing interest rates monitored by a central bank in Mark-0 is mandatory for policy makers to develop any
interest in the ABM research program in general and our model in particular. The aim of the present paper is to
parsimoniously extend Mark-0 as to capture the effects of monetary policy on the course of the economy. We first
identify and model several channels through which interest rates can feed into the behavior of firms and households.
We then study different policy experiments, whereby the “Central Bank” attempts to reach a target inflation and/or
unemployment level using a Taylor rule to set the interest rate (see Eq. (3) below). We find that provided the economy
is far from phase boundaries (or “dark corners” [5]) such policies can be successful, whereas too aggressive policies
may in fact, unwillingly, drive the economy to an unstable state, where large swings of inflation and unemployment
occur.
Our Agent-Based framework is voluntarily bare bones. It posits a minimal set of plausible ingredients that are
most probably present in the real world in one form or the other. For example, we assume reasonable heuristic rules
for the hiring/firing and wage policies of firms confronted with over- or under-production, or with a rising level of
debt. Similarly, our model encodes in a schematic manner the consumption behavior of households facing inflation
and rising rates, that is in fact similar to the standard Euler equation for consumption in general equilibrium/DSGE
models [3]. Our approach is therefore prone to the usual critique addressed to ABMs: the rules we implement are
– although reasonable – to some degree arbitrary. The ABM community is of course aware of this weakness, with
many attempts to resolve it, such as imposing consistency constraints on behavioral assumptions (see [9], Appendix
A), or, even better, relying on micro-panel data that reveal how firms and households actually make decisions under
different macro-economic or specific conditions (see for example [10, 11] for the behavior of firms, and [12–14] for the
behaviour of households). However, reliable empirical data are still rather scarce and do not allow yet to answer all
the questions needed to constrain and calibrate an ABM, even simple ones like Mark-0.
Our philosophy, explained in detail in [1], is different. We argue that the qualitative, aggregate behavior elicited by
the Mark-0 model is in fact robust and generic, although the actual quantitative aspects may not be (as, for example,
the precise value of the parameters of the Taylor rule beyond which instabilities occur). In other words, if one forgoes
the idea of quantitatively predicting the macro-behaviour of the economy but is satisfied (at least temporarily) with
a qualitative description of the possible aggregate behaviour, some progress is possible without detailed knowledge of
the micro-rules. Our belief is backed by the idea – pervasive in many areas of science – that the aggregate properties
of interacting entities can be classified in different phases, separated by phase boundaries across which radical changes
of the emergent behavior take place. This idea has a long history, in particular in economics – remember, for example,
the title of Thomas Schelling’s famous book: Micromotives and Macrobehaviour [15]; for more recent progress see
e.g. [16–21] and for recent reviews: [22, 23]. To bolster our belief that emergent aggregate properties are robust against
micro-changes, we have tested many variants of the model presented below and indeed found that the overall behavior
of our artificial economy is remarkably robust – in particular the presence of instabilities and crises. Following up on
O. Blanchard’s lament [5], the existence of large swaths of the parameter space where the economy is prone to violent
crises seems to be an unavoidable fact that we have to learn to confront with [16, 24].
The work presented in this paper is part of a growing literature of macroeconomic agent-based model [25, 26]. In the
recent years several such models have been developed, allowing both to reproduce macro-stylized facts and to study
policy design [27]. Building upon [7], Dosi et al. [28, 29] characterize the impact of fiscal and monetary policies on
macroeconomics fluctuations. Fiscal policies are found to have a greater role in dampening business cycles, reducing
unemployment and the likelihood of economic crises. Another example somewhat related to our work is Ref. [30],
4which focuses on a simple ABM of financial markets coupled with a New Keynesian DSGE model, which allows one
to reproduce endogenously stock price bubbles and business cycles and to study the introduction of financial taxes.
Calibration and validation procedures have been explored in [31–33].
Although similar in spirit, the present study builds upon a slightly different perspective, following the framework and
philosophy developed in [1]. In particular, we model an idealized closed economy with linear production capabilities,
no capital (labor is the only input for production), no innovation and growth, no financial sector, and only a minimal
set of additional behavioural rules which couple the Central Bank monetary policy to firms’ and agents’ choices. In
this sense, our model is much more parsimonious than what is found in the recent ABM literature and voluntarily
overlooks important actors and processes at play in the real world. Our central concern is instead to characterize
the qualitative behaviour of the emerging economy and investigate its dynamical stability with respect to the Central
Bank’s policy.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we give a brief description of the Mark-0 model proposed
in [1] and detail the minimal additional rules we need to couple the monetary policy with firms’ and agents’ decisions.
In Section III, we investigate the “natural” state of our toy-economy, in the presence of interest rates but without
any Central Bank intervention. In Section IV, we perform several policy experiments: an expansionary monetary
shock, and the implementation of a Taylor-rule monitoring of the interest rate by the Central Bank to achieve given
employement and inflation targets. We establish the phase diagram of our model in the presence of this Taylor-rule
based intervention. We briefly compare our findings to the prediction of DSGE models. We conclude in Section V.
Appendix A gives further details about Mark-0; Appendix B investigates the continuous phase transition induced by
the wary behaviour of indebted firms; finally, Appendix C gives a full pseudo-code of our model that should allow
easy duplication of our results.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
A. Brief summary of the minimal “Mark-0” model
The Mark-0 closed economy is made of firms and households. While the latter sector is represented at an aggregate
level, firms are heterogeneous and treated individually. Each firm i = 1, . . . , NF at time t produces a quantity Yi(t) of
perishable goods that it attempts to sell at price pi(t). It needs a number of Ni(t) = Yi(t)/ζi of employees
1 to produce
Yi(t), and pays a wage Wi(t). The demand Di for good i depends on the global consumption budget of households
CB(t), itself determined as a fraction of the household savings (that include the last wages), and it is a decreasing
function of the asked price pi(t), with a price sensitivity parameter that can be tuned – see Appendix A.
To update their production, price and wage policy, firms use reasonable “rules of thumb” [1] that we detail in
Appendix A and that were already (partly) justified in the original work of Delli Gatti et al. [2]. For example,
production is decreased and employees are made redundant whenever Yi > Di, and vice-versa.
2 The adjustment
speed can however be asymmetric, i.e. the ratio R of hiring adjustement speed to firing adjustement speed is not
necessarily equal to one, for example because of labour laws. This turns out to be one of the most important control
parameter that determines the fate of the overall economy.
In the initial state of the economy, firms are heterogenous in size and prices (with a uniform distribution around
the average size and price, see Appendix C for details), but all offer the same wage and see the same demand. This
is arbitrary and of little importance, because the stationary state of the model is statistically independent of the
initialization.
When the Mark-0 economy is set in motion, it soon becomes clear that some firms have to take up loans in order
to stay in business. One therefore immediately has to add further rules for this to take place. In the zero-interest rate
world of Mark-0, we let firms freely accumulate a total debt up to a threshold that is a multiple Θ of total payroll,
beyond which the firm is declared bankrupt (its debt is then repaid partly by households and partly by surviving firms,
such that there is no net creation of money). From this point of view the parameter Θ determines the maximum credit
supply available to firms. Fixing the value of Θ plays the role of a primitive monetary policy, since the total amount
of money circulating in the economy (‘broad money’) directly depends on Θ [1]. When Θ = 0, no debt is allowed
1 ζi is the productivity of firm i. We chose ζi = 1 in [1] and we will stick to this choice throughout the present paper as well.
2 As a consequence of these adaptive adjustments, the economy can reach (in some regions of the parameter space) equilibrium, corre-
sponding to the market clearing condition one would obtain in a fully representative agent framework. However, fluctuations around
equilibrium persists in the limit of large system sizes giving rise to a rich phenomenology, see [1, 2].
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FIG. 1: (Left) Phase diagram in the R − Θ plane of the basic Mark-0 model as obtained in [1] with wage update. There
are four distinct phases separated by critical lines. The Full Employment (FE) phase (R > Rc, Θ large) is characterized by
positive average inflation, while there is deflation in the Full Unemployment (FU) phase (R < Rc). Endogenous Crises (EC)
are characterized by alternating cycles of inflation and deflation, and occur for R > Rc, Θ intermediate. Finally, R > Rc, small
Θ correspond to a region of small inflation and Residual Unemployment (RU). The location of phase boundaries is only weakly
affected by the choice of the other parameters of Mark-0, see [1]. (Right) Typical trajectories of the unemployment rate u(t) for
each of the phases. In the inset, the price variations are shown, displaying either inflation (in the FE phase) or deflation (in the
FU phase). γ−1p (resp. γ
−1
w ) sets the characteristic time scale for price adjustments (resp. wages) in the model, see Appendix
A. The surprising occurrence of endogenous oscillations in the EC phase can be fully understood analytically, see [34].
(zero leverage), while when Θ → ∞, firms have not limit on the loans they need to continue business (unbounded
leverage).
While there are several other parameters needed to define completely Mark-0 (9 parameters in total, see Appendix
A), the detailed investigation of [1] has established that only R and Θ are the ones determining the phase-diagram of
the model, shown in Fig. 1, where we also plot typical trajectories of the economy in each phase. It is important to
stress that this diagram is extremely robust against both details of the model specification and the value of the other
parameters, which only affect the above phenomenology quantitatively, but leave the qualitative emergent behavior
essentially unchanged. Its salient features are [1]:
• When Θ =∞ the economy is characterized by two distinct phases separated by a first order (discontinuous) phase
transition as a function of the parameter R. When R < Rc (i.e. fast downward production adjustments), one
finds at long times a collapse of the economy towards a deflationary/low demand/full unemployment state (FU).
For R > Rc, on the other hand, the long run state of the economy is characterized by a positive inflation/high
demand/full employment phase (FE).
• When Θ <∞ the above description holds but must be refined to allow for the appearance of three sub-phases
for R > Rc:
1. a full employment and inflationary phase for high values of Θ (the FE phase, similar to the Θ =∞ case);
2. a phase for intermediate values of Θ characterized by high employment and inflation on average, which is,
however, intermittently disrupted by “endogenous crises” (EC), that temporarily bring deflation and high
unemployment spikes;
3. a phase with zero inflation and residual unemployment for small Θ (the RU phase), where the impossibility
to obtain loans creates a positive stationary level of bankruptcies.
Note that the unexpected occurrence of purely endogenous oscillations in the EC phase can in fact be understood
fully analytically [34] and it is a robust feature that only relies on very mild assumptions about the destabilizing
feedback mechanisms present in the economy.
6B. Introducing interest rates in Mark-0
We now introduce in the model a banking system made up of a Central Bank (CB) which sets the base interest
rate ρ0(t) (and, as part of a prudential policy, the parameter Θ that controls the maximum credit supply available to
firms), and a private banking system that will act as a transmission belt for the CB policy, by setting interest rates
on deposits (ρd(t)) and on loans (ρ`(t)). These interest rates will in turn impact the economy through three channels
that we detail below: a) direct cost of loans and gains on deposits; b) behavior of the firms; c) behavior of households.
1. The Central Bank policy
The CB attempts to steer the economy towards a target inflation level pi∗ and employment level ε∗ (equivalent to a
target output, since the productivity ζ is set to unity in the present version of the model). The instantaneous inflation
pi(t) and employment level ε(t) are defined here as:
pi(t) =
p(t)− p(t− 1)
p(t− 1) ; p(t) =
∑
i pi(t)Yi(t)∑
i Yi(t)
, (1)
where p(t) is the production-weighted average price, and:
ε(t) =
1
N
∑
i
Yi(t) , u(t) = 1− ε(t), (2)
where N is the total workforce, and ε(t), u(t) are respectively the employment and unemployment rate.
We will assume that the monetary policy followed by the CB for fixing the base interest rate is described by a
standard Taylor rule of the form [3, 35]:3
ρ0(t) = max (ρ
∗ + 10 φpi[pi(t)− pi∗] + φε log [ε˜(t)/ε̂∗], 0) (3)
where ρ∗ is the “natural” interest rate that would prevail if the target inflation pi∗ and target employment ε∗ were
reached, and αpi,ε > 0 quantify the intensity of the policy (high values of the parameters correspond to aggressive
policies). Note that ρ0 is constrained to be non-negative. The factor 10 in front of φpi is only there for convenience,
such that interesting values of φpi and φε are of the same order of magnitude. The notation x˜(t) corresponds to the
exponential moving average of the variable x(t), defined as:4
x˜(t+ 1) = ωx(t) + (1− ω)x˜(t). (4)
In order to avoid unnecessary excessive policy response when the target employment rate is too far from the actual
employment rate, we actually define a one-time-step target employment rate ε̂∗ as
ε̂∗ = min {1.025 ε˜(t), ε∗} (5)
meaning that if the employment rate is much lower than the policy target ε∗ the CB will try to increase it by 2.5%
at each time step until the target is reached. Such a regularization was found not to be needed for inflation.
2. The banking sector
Households in the Mark-0 economy cannot borrow and are thus characterized by their total savings S(t) ≥ 0.
Firms, on the other hand, can have either deposits (Ei > 0) or liabilities (Ei < 0). Defining E+ =
∑
i max (Ei, 0) andE− = −∑i min (Ei, 0), the balance sheet of the banking system reads:
M + E−(t) = S(t) + E+(t) ≡ X (t), (6)
3 In Gal`ı’s reference book [3], the quantity φε is noted φy .
4 We chose ω = 0.2, which corresponds to an averaging time of about −1/ log (1− ωτ ) ≈ 4.5 time steps.
7where M is the amount of currency (or initial deposits) created by the central bank, which is kept fixed in time, and
X is the total amount of deposits, therefore to initial deposits M plus the money created by the banking system when
issuing loans.
We now assume that the banking sector fixes the interest rates on deposits and loans (ρd(t) and ρ`(t) respectively)
uniformly for all lenders and borrowers according to the following rules:5
ρ`(t) = ρ0(t) + f
D(t)
E−(t)
ρd(t) =
ρ0(t)E−(t)− (1− f)D(t)
X (t) . (7)
where D(t) is the aggregate costs coming from all firms that just defaulted, bearing on the banking sector. Note that
ρd ≤ ρ0 ≤ ρ`. The parameter f ∈ [0, 1] reflects the impact of these defaults – either entirely on the cost of loans
(f = 1) or on the revenue of deposits (f = 0). The logic behind rule Eq. (7) is that the interest rate on loan increases
when defaults increase, while the rate on deposits is chosen in such a way that the profits of the banking sector are
exactly zero at each time step. Indeed, one has, for any value of f :
ρ`(t)E−(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest from loans
− ρd(t)X (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest paid on deposits
− D(t)︸︷︷︸
cost of defaults
≡ 0. (8)
Note that ρd(t) can become negative for large enough D(t) when f 6= 1, i.e. the deposits are taxed by the banking
sector. This could be interpreted as a kind of “bail-in tax” to absorb debt in extreme cases. In our simulations where
f = 0.5, this situation does occur in the unstable phases of the economy during a relatively short fraction of the time,
corresponding to the peaks of the unemployment spikes. Finally, one could introduce an extra haircut in ρ` or ρd if
one wants to model a profit-seeking banking sector, but the resulting profits would somehow have to be re-injected in
the economy – an extra modeling step that we avoid at this stage by assuming the above no-profit rule.
3. Households’ consumption budget
As mentioned above, one major simplification of Mark-0 is to treat the whole household sector at the aggregate
level, and to represent it with only a few variables: total savings S(t), total wages WT (t) =
∑
iWi(t)Yi(t), and total
consumption budget CB(t) (which, as emphasized in [1], is in general larger than the actual consumption C(t)).
The effect of interest rates on households is two-fold. First, quite trivially, they receive some interest on their savings
S(t) that adds to the wages WT (t) and dividends as their total income. Second, the comparison between interest
rates and inflation creates an incentive to consume or to save. This is in the spirit of the standard Euler equation of
DSGE models where consumption is found to depend on the difference of rates on deposits ρd(t) and inflation pi(t)
(see e.g. [3, 35]). We therefore posit that the consumption budget of households CB(t) is given by:
CB(t) = c(t)
[
S(t) +WT (t) + ρ
d(t)S(t)
]
with c(t) = c0
[
1 + αc(pit − ρ˜dt )
]
, (9)
where c(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the consumption propensity (taken to be a constant in Mark-0) and αc > 0 is a coupling constant
that determines the sensitivity of households to the (moving average of the) difference between inflation and the
interest paid on their savings. The larger the difference between the two, the larger the propensity to consume, as
in standard equilibrium models [35], but with here undetermined phenomenological parameters c0, αc that should in
principle be measured on micro-data (surveys, laboratory experiments, etc., see e.g. [12–14]).
Apart from these changes, the behavior of households is exactly the same as in Mark-0, see [1] and Appendix A for
details.
4. Firms’ policy when debt is costly
a. Financial fragility. Unlike households the NF firms are heterogeneous and treated individually. Each firm is
characterized by its production Yi (equal to its workforce), demand for its goods Di, price pi, wage Wi and cash
5 Note that the parameter f is similar to, but different from the parameter also called f in [1], which was used to share the cost of defaults
on firms and households.
8balance Ei. The debt level of a firm is measured through the ratio
Φi = −Ei/(WiYi), (10)
which we interpret as an index of financial fragility. If Φi(t) < Θ, i.e. when the flux of credit needed from the bank
is not too high compared to the size of the company (measured as the total payroll), the firm is allowed to continue
its activity. If on the other hand Φi(t) ≥ Θ, the firm defaults and contributes to total default costs D(t).
b. Production and wage update. If the firm is allowed to continue its business, it adapts its price, wages and
productions according to reasonable “rules of thumb” introduced in [1] – see Appendix A. In particular, the production
update is chosen as:
If Yi(t) < Di(t) ⇒ Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t) + min{η+i (Di(t)− Yi(t)), u∗i (t)}
If Yi(t) > Di(t) ⇒ Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t)− η−i [Yi(t)−Di(t)]
(11)
where u∗i (t) is the maximum number of unemployed workers available to the firm i at time t (see Appendix A). The
coefficients η± ∈ [0, 1] express the sensitivity of the firm’s target production to excess demand/supply, and they were
constant in Mark-0.
Here, we further postulate that the production adjustment depends on the financial fragility Φi of the firm. Firms
that are close to bankruptcy are arguably faster to fire and slower to hire, and vice-versa for healthy firms. In order
to model this tendency, we posit that the coefficients η±i for firm i are given by:
η−i = η0 max(1 + ΓΦi(t), 0)
η+i = Rη0 max(1− ΓΦi(t), 0) (12)
where η0 is a fixed coefficient, identical for all firms, and R is the propensity ratio discussed in the previous section.
The factor Γ > 0 measures how the financial fragility of firms influences their hiring/firing policy, since a larger value
of Φi then leads to a faster downward adjustment of the workforce when the firm is over-producing, and a slower
(more cautious) upward adjustment when the firm is under-producing. The above definition however ensures that η±
always remain non-negative, i.e. the reaction of the firms is always in the intuitive direction.
It is plausible that the financial fragility of the firm also affects its wage policy: we give in Appendix A the wage
update rules of Mark-0 and their modification to account for financial fragility, through the very same parameter Γ.
In essence, deeply indebted firms seek to reduce wages more rapidly, whereas flourishing firms tend to increase wages
quickly.
The baseline Mark-0 model corresponds to Γ ≡ 0, and leads to the phase diagram shown in Fig. 1 above. Interest-
ingly, a non-zero value of Γ = Γ0 (constant across firms and in time) changes substantially the nature – but not the
existence – of the phase transition between the full employment (FE) and full unemployment (FU) phase. The first
order (discontinuous) transition for Γ0 = 0, Θ = ∞ found in [1] and shown in Fig. 1, is replaced by a second order
(continuous) transition when the firms adapt their behavior as a function of their financial fragility, i.e. when Γ0 > 0.
Moreover, the “bad” FU phase for R < Rc becomes a partial unemployment phase with u < 1 that continuously
varies with R: see Appendix B and Fig. 9 for full details. As firms become more careful, employment can be to some
extent preserved – as expected.
The “good” phase of the economy, on the other hand, is only mildly affected by a non zero Γ0 – for example the
FE region of Fig. 1 expands downwards, which is expected since firms manage more carefully their balance sheet,
reducing the occurrence of defaults.
c. The influence of interest rates on the strategy of firms. We now argue that Γ should in fact depend on the
difference between the interest rate and the inflation: high cost of credit makes firms particularly wary of going into
debt and their sensitivity to their financial fragility should be increased. Therefore, we postulate that interest rates
feedback into the behavior of the firm primarily through the Γ parameter, that we model in the simplest possible way
as:
Γ = max {αΓ(ρ˜`(t)− pi(t)),Γ0}, (13)
where αΓ (similarly to αc above) captures the influence of the real interest rate ρ˜
`(t)−pi(t) on the hiring/firing policy
of the firms. Whenever the real interest rate stays below Γ0/αΓ, the response of firms to changes of interest rates
is negligible (perhaps as reported in [11]), whereas larger rates lead to a substantial change in the firms policy. The
case αΓ = 0 but Γ0 > 0 corresponds to the above discussion and it is interesting in itself (see Appendix B). However,
since we will be mostly concerned with policy issues, we will concentrate below on the other extreme case, αΓ > 0
and Γ0 = 0, keeping in mind that reality is probably in-between. Note that Γ as defined above is now zero when real
interest rates are negative, and is positive otherwise.
9C. Summary
1. How many new assumptions?
In our attempt to include interest rates and monetary policy into the Mark-0 framework, we have made new
behavioral assumptions, that we tried to keep as simple and as parsimonious as possible:
• For the Central Bank, we have merely adapted the standard Taylor rule to our setting, introducing three
monetary policy parameters ρ∗ (the natural interest rate) and φpi, φε (the Taylor rule parameters), and two
targets: inflation pi∗ and employment ε∗.
• For the banking sector, we have essentially used trivial accounting rules to ensure a no-profit condition on loans
and deposits. The only new parameter is f and determines how much of the cost of bankruptcy must be paid by
loans or by deposits. However, this parameter plays very little role in the qualitative behaviour of the economy,
so we set it to f = 1/2 henceforth.
• For the households, we assume an Euler-like behaviour of the consumption budget as a function of the real
interest rate on deposits, i.e. the consumption budget decreases when the real rate is high and increases when
it is low, with a slope given by parameter αc.
• For the firms, the hiring/firing and wage policy is affected by the real rate on loans. When it is high, indebted
firms are more careful, firing more rapidly and hiring less. The unique parameter coupling the real interest rate
to the firms policy is αΓ.
These last two additional rules are to some extent arbitrary. However, they capture effects that certainly exist in the
real world; furthermore changing the detailed implementation we chose here while keeping the spirit of these rules
lead to very similar conclusions. This is in line with our general claim that macro-behaviour is to a large degree
insensitive to micro-rules.
In summary, we want to emphasize that our extension of Mark-0 is very parsimonious: we have only added two
behavioral parameters (αc, αΓ).
2. Recovering Mark-0
From the above discussion, we see that the core Mark-0 model of [1] is recovered whenever the baseline interest
rate is zero ρ∗ = 0, the CB is inactive (φpi = φε = 0), and households and firms are insensitive to interest rates and
inflation (i.e. setting αc = αΓ = 0).
There is however a slight remaining difference with Mark-0 in the resolution of bankruptcies. The closest one can
get is by setting f = 0, i.e. absorbing default costs only through savings. In this case the only non-zero interest rate
remaining in the dynamics of the model is the one on deposits, which is negative: ρd = −D(t)/X (t) ≤ 0. This indeed
roughly corresponds to the default resolution described in [1] where default costs are paid by households and firms
savings.6 There are also minor differences in the time-line of the model (in particular bankruptcies are resolved before
price, production and wages are updated). All these differences however have a negligible quantitative impact on the
results below.
III. THE “NATURAL” BEHAVIOR OF THE ECONOMY (WITHOUT MONETARY POLICY)
In this section we analyze the features of the model that arise from the introduction of interest rates in the Mark-0
economy, disregarding for a while any active monetary policy (i.e. setting φpi = φε ≡ 0 in Eq. (3) above). In other
words, we study an economy where the baseline interest rate is equal to ρ∗, constant in time, and affects both the
consumption propensity of households through the parameter αc appearing in Eq. (9), and the firms hiring/firing
propensity through the parameter αΓ appearing in Eq. (13), with Γ0 = 0 henceforth.
When interest rates do not feedback at all into firms’ and agents’ behavior (i.e. for αΓ = Γ0 = 0 and αc = 0) the
phenomenology of the Mark-0 model is basically unaffected; in particular the phase diagram Fig. 1 is unchanged.
6 To be more precise, in the default resolution described in [1] we introduce a bailout probability, called f there, which sets the relative
impact of default costs on households and firms savings. In this sense, the present setting recovers the one in [1] with f ≈ 1/2.
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FIG. 2: Left: Phase diagram of the “natural” state of the economy in the ρ∗ − Θ plane (i.e. with no monetary policy,
φε = φpi = 0) when both firms’ and households’ decisions are sensitive to the rate level: αΓ = 50 and αc = 4. For small enough
rates ρ∗ < ρ∗∗, one recovers the FE-EC-RU phases as Θ is decreased. When ρ∗ > ρ∗∗, however, the RU phase prevails for all
values of Θ, which becomes irrelevant. Right: Phase diagram in the ρ∗ − αΓ plane for Θ = 3, showing the dependence of the
critical value ρ∗∗ on αΓ. The other parameters of the model are set to: R = 2 (with η0− = 0.1), c0 = 0.5, Γ0 = 0, ϕ = 0.1,
γp = γw = 0.05, β = 2, δ = 0.02, f = 0.5, NF = 2000 (see Appendix A for a definition of all these parameters).
A. Coupling between interest rates and firms behavior
When αΓ > 0, on the other hand, the overall behavior of the economy evolves as expected: as long as ρ
∗ is less than
the inflation rate, nothing much happens, in particular because Eq. (13) gives Γ = Γ0 ≡ 0 here. When ρ∗ exceeds the
inflation rate, one observes that the unemployment rate u starts increasing with ρ∗, while the demand for credit and
the inflation rate itself nosedive as expected.
In Fig. 2 (left) we plot the phase diagram of the model in the ρ∗−Θ plane when R = 2 > Rc, and for a fixed value
αΓ = 50.
7 For ρ∗ smaller than a certain value ρ∗∗ ≈ 1.3, one observes the familiar three phases FE-EC-RU as Θ is
decreased, as in Fig. 1. However, for a baseline rate larger than ρ∗∗, the FE and EC phase disappear entirely, and
the Residual Employment phase (with u ∼ 30%) prevails for all values of Θ. To wit, when interest rates are too high,
firms hesitate to accumulate more debt (even if they are allowed to when Θ is high). Rather, they prefer reducing
their work force when needed, keeping the unemployement at a relatively high level.
Fig. 2 (right) allows one to understand the role of αΓ: there we show the phase diagram in the ρ
∗ − αΓ plane for
fixed values of R = 2 and Θ = 3, such that the economy is in the Full Employment phase for αΓ = 0. A sudden phase
transition between the FE and RU phases occurs for a critical value ρ∗∗(αΓ); the larger the sensitivity to interest
rates – i.e. the larger αΓ – the smaller the critical value of the baseline interest rate beyond which the economy is
destabilized. It is interesting (and quite counterintuitive) that the aggregate behavior of the economy is not a smooth
function of the interest rate. When firms are risk averse and fear going into debt, large enough interest rates lead to
more unemployment that spirals into a destabilizing feedback loop. This is one of the “dark corners” that ABMs can
help uncovering.
B. Coupling between interest rates and household behavior
Perhaps unexpectedly, the coupling between interest rate and consumption (captured by parameter αc) appears to
have much smaller influence on the “natural” state of the economy, at least when αc is chosen within a reasonable
range. Its main influence is to increase the output fluctuations around the steady state, by amplifying price trends
through the resulting reduction/increase in consumption. Interestingly, we find that for Θ 1 and independently of
7 This value of αΓ has the following interpretation: when the debt of a firm equals its payroll, i.e. when Φi = 1, a real interest rate of 8%
annual leads to a freezing of all hires and a doubling of the firing rate, compared to a zero-debt situation.
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FIG. 3: Aggregate response of the economy to a policy shock represented by a drop in the interest rate ρ0 set by the central
bank (from 2% to 1.8%). The vertical dashed line gives the timing of the policy shock. All aggregate variables are represented
as a relative variation from their average values prior to the shock. For a better visualization, we amplified by a factor 100 the
wage and price responses. Note that the damped oscillation relaxation towards equilibrium. Parameters are Θ = 3, ρ∗ = 2%,
αΓ = 50, αc = 4, and other parameters as in Fig. 2.
ρ∗, αc has a stabilising effect on the economy: Rc shifts to lower values as αc increases (in the absence of monetary
policy). Clearly, micro-data is needed to estimate the value of αc for realistic applications; but since this parameter
plays a small role we will choose rather arbitrarily αc = 4, unless explicitly stated. This corresponds to a moderate
sensitivity to inflation/interest rates: a rise of the interest rate of 1%/year corresponds to a decrease of 4% of the
consumption propensity.
IV. MONETARY POLICY EXPERIMENTS
We now consider a simple policy framework where the Central Bank adjusts the base interest rate ρ0(t) in order
to achieve its inflation and employment targets. Given the simplicity of our model we are mainly interested here in
gaining a qualitative understanding of the possible consequence of a Taylor-rule based monetary policy in a stylized
Agent-Based framework. We defer parameter calibration, detailed comparison with simple DSGE models and more
quantitative insights to future studies.
Our major finding is that provided its policy is not too aggressive and the economy not too close to a phase
transition, the CB is successful in steering the economy towards its targets. However, the mere presence of different
equilibrium states of the economy separated by phase boundaries (i.e. “dark corners”) may deeply alter the impact
of monetary policy. Indeed, we will exhibit cases where the monetary policy by itself triggers large instabilities and is
counter-productive.
As in the previous section, we will refer to the state obtained without any response of the CB, i.e. when φpi = φε = 0,
as the “natural” state of the economy (for a given set of parameters). The corresponding “natural” value of a variable
x will be denoted by xnat. In order to simplify the analysis and since most of the parameters of our model play little
role in the qualitative behavior of the economy we set once and for all some of them to the values given in the caption
of Fig. 2 and choose ρ∗ = 2%. We only focus on the four parameters defining the CB policy (i.e. φpi, φε, ε∗ and
pi∗), the parameters of the transmission channels (i.e. αc and αΓ), and the two parameters locating the system in the
phase diagram of Fig. 1 (i.e. the hiring/firing ratio R and the bankruptcy threshold Θ).
A. A monetary shock
In order to check that our framework produces reasonable results, it is interesting to start with the simplest policy
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FIG. 4: In these plots we select the same natural state of the economy with Θ = 2, R = 2, ρ∗ = 2% and αΓ = 50, such that
unat ≈ 0.33 and pinat ≈ 0 (but fluctuating). The CB sets a much lower unemployment target of u∗ = 0.05 and an inflation
target of pi∗ = 0.2%. In the left plot the CB policy is moderate (φpi = φε = 0.5) and basically achieves its goals, while in the
right plot the policy is aggressive (φpi = φε = 1) and destabilizes the whole economy. In the insets, ρ0 and pi are given in %s.
The period of the business cycles in the right plot corresponds to ≈ 4 years if the elementary time unit of the model is one
month. Larger spikes of unemployment are also observed with much lower frequency (not shown).
experiment, i.e. an expansionary monetary policy shock where the baseline interest rate is instantaneously decreased
from 2% to 1.8%, all other parameters of the model being fixed, and with no further intervention of the Central Bank
(i.e. φpi = φε = 0). The resulting dynamics of output, wages and prices is shown in Fig. 3 and can be compared
with e.g. Fig 1 of Ref. [36]. It is gratifying to see that our simple modelling strategy, in particular the way the
monetary policy is channelled to the economy, does lead to a quite realistic shape of impulse response functions, at
least qualitatively. In fact, the empirical hump-shaped response of the output reported in [36] is quite well reproduced
by their DSGE model with nominal rigidities. Although the underlying microfundations are very different, our ABM
indeed includes frictions: all adjustments (of production, wages and prices) in our model are only made progressively.
So our framework is indeed able to capture effects predicted by enhanced DSGE models. No attempt was made here
to adjust parameters to quantitatively match empirical data, in particular the time scales: this is beyond the scope
of the present study which is primarily intended to be a description of the qualitative behavior of our toy-economy.
B. Mild vs aggressive monetary policy
In Fig. 4 for example, we show the result of the policy of the Central Bank that attempts to bring down the natural
unemployment rate of unat ≈ 0.33 (a rather large value corresponding to Θ = 2, R = 2 and ρ∗ = 2%) to a low target
of 1− ε∗ = u∗ = 0.05. The target inflation is pi∗ = 0.2% per time step (corresponding to 2.4% annual if one interprets
the time step to be a month), compared to a natural inflation that fluctuates around zero: pinat ≈ 0. The left graph
corresponds to a mild monetary policy, with Taylor-rule parameters set to φpi = φε = 0.5. The policy is seen to be
rather successful: the inflation is on target, while unemployment goes down to u ≈ 0.07, not far from the target of
0.05. But now look at the graph on the right, where the only difference is the aggressiveness of the CB that attempts
to reach target too quickly, merely doubling the value of φpi = φε → 1. In this case, the monetary policy has induced
strong instabilities, with “business cycles” of large amplitude and inflation all over the place.
We show in Fig. 5 the result of an extensive exploration of the role of φpi and φε when Θ = 2, R = 2 and
ρ∗ = 2%. One sees that there is a wedge-like region around φpi = φε = 0 where the policy does not induce instabilities
(signaled by a yellow/orange hue in Fig. 5-right). However, the region of parameters where the unemployment rate is
significantly reduced is only a subset of this wedge, corresponding to the black region in Fig. 5-left, where φε ∼ 0.5,
φpi ≤ 0.5. In other words, the Central Bank must navigate in a narrow window: too little is not enough, too aggressive
is counterproductive and leads to instabilities and wildly oscillating economies.
Fig. 5 also reveal that in our toy-world, a Central Bank with a dual mandate (inflation and output) enjoys a wider
region of stability compared to a Central bank with inflation as the only mandate. Steering inflation and output
simultaneously increases the probability of a successful monetary policy.
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FIG. 5: Policy performance in the (φpi, φε) plane (the origin corresponds to the natural state of the economy), for Θ = 2, R = 2,
ρ∗ = 2%, αΓ = 50 and αc = 4. The target inflation and unemployment are, respectively, pi∗ = 0.2% and u∗ = 0.05. Left: Color
map of the average unemployment; Right: Color map of the amplitude of the business cycle, measured as maxt(u)−mint(u).
Yellow/orange regions correspond to unstable economies with crises of large amplitude. As one can see the policy is effective
as long as it is not too aggressive, with a sharp transition to a regime where it becomes detrimental. The closer the natural
economy to a phase boundary, the more destabilizing the policy – see Fig. 6.
C. The role of phase boundaries
The fragility of the economy is clearly due to the proximity of the phase boundary that appears in Fig. 2. As one
moves away from the boundary, for example by increasing Θ, one finds that the region where the CB policy is harmful
shrinks. We illustrate this by moving along the line φpi = φε ≡ φCB in parameter space. We display in Fig. 6 the
phase diagram of the model in the (φCB,Θ) plane and in the (φCB, R) plane. One clearly sees from the left graph
on the top row that the deep blue region (corresponding to low unemployment) expands for larger Θ, and that the
yellow/orange region of the graph on the right (corresponding to strong oscillations) recedes.
The bottom graphs illustrate the role of R. One mostly observes that:
• (a) deep in the FU phase (R < 0.75), the monetary policy is helpless in restoring employment;
• (b) for intermediate values of R, large enough values of φCB do lead to small unemployment rates;
• (c) when R and φCB are simultaneously large, instabilities appear (see Fig. 6 right bottom graph, north-east
corner).
Point (a) above is interesting and can be understood as follows: when R is small, firms are so quick to adjust production
downwards that they never need credit, and their financial fragility is low or even negative. The interest-rate impact
parameter αΓ then becomes completely ineffective in this case. This could be relevant to understand the aftermath
of the 2008 crisis: if one interprets strong downsizing (i.e. small R) as a result of a drop of confidence induced by the
Lehman crisis, the above discussion suggests that a low interest rate policy might not be as effective as one may have
expected.
As a complement to the above analysis we also investigated the performance of the policy as a function of the
distance between target and natural values. We find, not surprisingly, that when targets are not too far from the
natural state of the economy the CB manages to achieve its targets without triggering any instability. When however
targets are far from the natural state even a mild policy may become detrimental and trigger instabilities.
D. The role of households and firms sensitivity to rates
We have also investigated the role of the two policy transmission channels (αΓ, firms and αc, households) separately,
and found that both channels in isolation may trigger instabilities. In Fig. 7 we plot the policy performance in the
(φCB, αc) plane and the (φCB, αΓ) plane, with all other parameters fixed, in particular R = 2 and Θ = 3. As expected,
the top row shows that the larger the value of αc, the more careful the monetary policy has to be in order to avoid
instabilities. Note, interestingly, that there is a thin region in the (φCB, αc) plane (spot the yellow dots) where
unemployment goes to u ≈ 1, i.e. the economy is completely destabilized by the monetary policy!
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FIG. 6: A more systematic diagram of the effect observed in Fig. 5. Here we move on the diagonal φpi = φε of Fig. 5 on the
φCB-axis and plot the average unemployment u and unemployment variations maxt(u) −mint(u). The other axis is either Θ
(top row, for R = 2) or R (bottom row, for Θ = 10), still with αΓ = 50, αc = 4., pi
∗ = 0.2% and u∗ = 0.05. Note that since
αΓ > 0, the transition at Rc ≈ 1, φCB = 0 is second order (see Appendix B). As above, yellow/orange regions in the plots on
the right, correspond to unstable economies with crises of large amplitude.
The bottom row of Fig. 7 shows the interplay between policy aggressiveness φCB and firms sensitivity to the real
interest rate αΓ. When φCB = 0, one recovers the FE-RU transition for αΓ ≈ 30 already observed in Fig. 2. For
larger αΓ’s, the CB policy is at first successful in reinstalling the FE phase, before destabilizing again the economy
beyond φ∗CB ≈ 0.9. When αΓ becomes small, a portion of the FE region expands up to higher values of φCB ≈ 1.25.
A detailed comparison between Fig. 6 (top row) and Fig. 7 (bottom row) reveals that the simultaneous presence of
the two transmission channels has an overall stabilizing effect. Indeed, when only one channel is present (i.e. either
αc or αΓ is zero) the value of φCB beyond which the system is unstable is smaller than when both channels are active.
For example, for Θ = 3, αc = 4. and αΓ = 50. one sees from Fig. 6 (top row; left, horizontal line) that the economy is
destabilized for φ∗CB ≈ 1.3, to be compared to φ∗CB ≈ 0.9 when αc = 0 and to φ∗CB ≈ 0.5 when αΓ = 0. Although we
cannot provide a complete interpretation, this interesting observation might be due to the fact that the α parameters
can be interpreted as “awareness” parameters that allow firms and agents to better anticipate crises and thus dampen
the destabilising influence of the Central Bank policy.
E. Comparison with DSGE models
It is quite interesting to compare the diagram of Fig. 5 with its DSGE counterpart (see e.g [3], section 4.3). Within
our Agent-Based framework, small values of φpi, φε are at worst ineffective wheras large values of φpi, φε lead to
instabilities. This is at the opposite of what is observed in the fully rational world of DSGE models, where small
values of φpi, φε lead to instabilities, while large values of φpi, φε allow the Central Bank to funnel the economy on a
stability path [3]. The intuition for this is made crystal clear by Gal`ı in [3]: The monetary authority should respond
to deviations of inflation and the output gap from their target levels by adjusting the nominal rate with “sufficient
strength”; [...] it is the presence of a “threat” of a strong response by the monetary authority to an eventual deviation
of the output gap and inflation from target that suffices to rule out any such deviation in equilibrium. In other words,
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FIG. 7: Policy performance, as in the previous two plots, now separately as a function of the households sensitivity to rates
αc and the firms sensitivity to rates αΓ. The x-axis is again φpi = φε ≡ φCB, whereas Θ = 3, R = 2 and ρ∗ = 2%, with
again pi∗ = 0.2% and u∗ = 0.05. (Top row) Here αΓ = 0 and αc > 0. The FE (black) region prevailing for αc = φCB = 0 is
destabilized beyond a certain φ∗CB that decreases as αc increases. Note the constellation of yellow points that correspond to
a completely broken economy. (Bottom row) We now set αc = 0 and vary αΓ > 0. When φCB = 0, one recovers the FE-RU
transition for αΓ ≈ 30 observed in Fig. 2. One sees that for larger αΓ’s, the CB policy is at first successful in reinstalling the
FE phase, before destabilizing again the economy beyond the vertical line φ∗CB ≈ 0.9.
fully rational, forward looking agents know that inflation will be tamed by the response of central authorities, an
element that is indeed completely absent in the myopic forecast world of most ABMs (including Mark-0), where
agents only use their knowledge of the past and present situation and adapt their behavior accordingly. The fact that
the outcome of these two hypotheses on the stability of the economy are so radically different should be a strong caveat.
Which of these two extreme visions of the world is closest to reality is of course a matter of empirical investigation
(on this point, see [37], and for recent attempts to include deviations from perfect rationality in DSGE models, see
e.g. [38]).
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION
In this paper, we parsimoniously extended the stylized macroeconomic Agent-Based Mark-0 model introduced
in [1], with the aim of investigating the role and efficacy of monetary policy. We focused on three effects induced by a
non-zero interest rate in the model, that are arguably the most important transmission channels of the Central Bank
policy: i) a change of the accounting rules to factor in the cost of debt and the extra revenue of deposits; ii) a change
of the consumption behavior of household that depends negatively on the real interest rate and iii) a change in the
hiring/firing and wage policies of firms, that avoid running into debt when interest rates increase. This amounts to
adding only two new parameters to the baseline Mark-0 model of [1].
We first studied the model in the absence of monetary policy, i.e. without a “Taylor-rule” that creates a feedback
between inflation, unemployment and interest rates. The introduction of a coupling between the financial fragility of
firms and the hiring/firing and wage policies has two main effects: a) the first order (discontinuous) phase transition
between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ phase of the economy, discussed in [1] is replaced by a second order (continuous)
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transition; b) a new first order transition to a phase with high residual unemployment (RU) appears when the interest
rate is larger than some critical value, even in the region where full employment (FE) is achieved for zero-interest rate
(i.e. Θ  1 in Fig. 1). The larger the sensitivity to interest rates, the smaller the value of the baseline rate beyond
which the economy is destabilized. In that region, allowing firms to accumulate more debt does not help stabilizing
the economy.
We then allowed the Central Bank to adjust the baseline rate so as to steer the economy towards prescribed levels
of inflation and employment. Our major finding is that provided its policy is not too aggressive (i.e. when the
targets are not too far from the ‘natural’ state of the economy, and for a low enough adjustment speed) the Central
Bank is successful in achieving its goals. However, the mere presence of different states of the economy separated by
phase boundaries, besides being interesting per se, can cause the monetary policy itself to trigger instabilities and be
counter-productive. The destabilizing influence of the Central Bank also depends on the firms/households sensitivities
to rates. Perhaps ironically, too small sensitivities make the Central Bank policy inefficient, but too large sensitivities
make the same policy dangerous. Seen differently, the Central Bank must navigate in a narrow window: too little is
not enough, too much leads to instabilities and wildly oscillating economies [39]. As mentioned in the last paragraph,
this conclusion strongly contrasts with the prediction of DSGE models. Interestingly, we also find that a Central
Bank with a dual mandate (inflation and output) enjoys a wider region of stability compared to a Central bank with
inflation as the only mandate.
As we emphasized in the introduction, the key message of both our previous paper [1] and the present one is that
even over-simplified macroeconomic ABMs generically display a rich phenomenology with an economy characterized
by different states separated by phase boundaries across which radical changes of the emergent behavior take place.
These are, we believe, the “dark corners” alluded to by O. Blanchard in [5], that both academics and policy makers
should account for and wrestle with. We believe that the major advantage of ABMs over DSGE-like models is the
very possibility of crises at the aggregate level, mediated by generic feedback mechanisms whose destabilizing role
may not be immediately obvious or intuitive. Rather than the precisely calibrated predictive tools that standard
equilibrium models claim to provide [24], ABMs offer extremely valuable qualitative tools for generating scenarios,
that can be used to foresee the unintended consequences of some policy decisions. Some of this outcomes, which would
be “Black Swans” [40] in a DSGE framework, can in fact be fully anticipated by schematic ABMs [41]. As expressed
with remarkable insight by Mark Buchanan [42]: Done properly, computer simulation represents a kind of “telescope
for the mind,” multiplying human powers of analysis and insight just as a telescope does our powers of vision. With
simulations, we can discover relationships that the unaided human mind, or even the human mind aided with the best
mathematical analysis, would never grasp.
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Appendix A: Price, production and wage updates
1. The households timeline
• At the beginning of the time step households are characterized by a certain amount of savings S(t) ≥ 0.
• After each firm chooses its production Yi(t), price Pi(t) and wage Wi(t) for the current time step (see later)
wages are paid. Since firms use a one-to-one linear technology taking only labor as input and productivity is
set to 1, the production equal the workforce of the firm. Hence, the total amount of wages paid is given by
WT (t) =
∑
i
Wi(t)Yi(t) (A1)
• Once the total payroll of the economy is determined, interests on deposits are paid and households set a
consumption budget as
CB(t) = c(t)[S(t) +WT (t) + ρ
d(t)S(t)] (A2)
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where c(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the propensity to consume and may depend on inflation/interests on deposits, see Eq. (9).
• The consumption budget is distributed among firms using an intensity of choice model [43]. The demand of
goods for firm i is therefore:
Di(t) =
CB(t)
pi(t)
e−βpi(t)/p(t)∑
i e
−βpi(t)/p(t) , (A3)
where β is the price sensitivity parameter determining an exponential dependence of households demand to the
price offered by the firm. Indeed, β = 0 corresponds to complete price insensitivity and β → ∞ means that
households select only the firm with the lowest price. In this sense, as long as β > 0 firms compete on prices.
• The actual consumption C(t) (limited by production) is given by
C(t) :=
NF∑
i=1
pi(t) min {Yi(t), Di(t)} ≤ CB(t) =
NF∑
i=1
pi(t)Di(t) (A4)
and households accounting therefore reads
S(t+ 1) = [1 + ρd(t)]S(t) +WT (t)−
∑
i
Pi(t) min {Di, Yi}+ ∆(t) (A5)
where ∆(t) are dividends paid (see below for a definition of this last term).
2. The firms timeline
• At the beginning of the time step t firms with Φi(t) ≥ Θ become inactive and are removed from the simulation.
Default costs are computed as
D(t) = −
∑
i bankrupt
Ei(t) . (A6)
Firms with Φi(t) < Θ are instead allowed to continue their activity and contribute to total loans E−(t) and
total firms savings E+(t) as
E− = −
∑
i not bankrupt
min {Ei(t), 0}
E+ =
∑
i not bankrupt
max {Ei(t), 0}. (A7)
• Active firms set production, price and wage for the current time step following simple adaptive rules which are
meant to represent an heuristic adjustment. In particular:
- Price:
Prices are updated through a random multiplicative process which takes into account the production-
demand gap experienced in the previous time step and if the price offered is competitive (with respect to
the average price). The update rule for prices reads:
If Yi(t) < Di(t) ⇒
{
If pi(t) < p(t) ⇒ pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)(1 + γpξi(t))
If pi(t) ≥ p(t) ⇒ pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)
If Yi(t) > Di(t) ⇒
{
If pi(t) > p(t) ⇒ pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)(1− γpξi(t))
If pi(t) ≤ p(t) ⇒ pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)
(A8)
where ξi(t) are independent uniform U [0, 1] random variables and γp is a parameter setting the relative
magnitude of the price adjustment (we set it to 5% unless stated otherwise). Fig. 8, which plots the
average profit of firms as a function of the offered price, shows that these rules lead to a reasonable
emergent “optimizing” behavior of firms. As expected, the profit reaches a maximum for prices slightly
above the average price p(t). Higher prices are not competitive and firms lose clients, while lower prices do
not cover production costs.
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FIG. 8: Scatter plot in one time step of firm profits vs the price offered. The red line correspond to a moving flat average of
100 consecutive points. Parameters are: R = 2 (with η0− = 0.1), Θ = 2, γp = γw = 0.05, αΓ = 50, Γ0 = 0, β = 2, αc = 4,
N = 5000 and ρ∗ = 0.5%.
- Production:
Independently of their price level, firms try to adjust their production to the observed demand. When
firms want to hire, they open positions on the job market; we assume that the total number of unemployed
workers, which is NFu(t), is distributed among firms according to an intensity of choice model which
depends on both the wage offered by the firm8 and on the same parameter β as it is for Eq. (A3); therefore
the maximum number of available workers to each firm is:
u∗i (t) =
eβWi(t)/w(t)∑
i e
βWi(t)/w(t)
NFu(t) . (A9)
The production update is then defined as:
If Yi(t) < Di(t) ⇒ Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t) + min{η+i (Di(t)− Yi(t)), u∗i (t)}
If Yi(t) > Di(t) ⇒ Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t)− η−i [Yi(t)−Di(t)]
(A10)
where η± ∈ [0, 1] are what we denote as the hiring/firing propensity of the firms. According to this
mechanism, the change in output responds to excess demand (there is an increase in output if excess
demand is positive, a decrease in output if excess demand is negative, i.e. if there is excess supply). The
propensities to hire/fire η± are the sensitivity of the output change to excess demand/supply.
- Wage:
The wage update rule we chose follows (in spirit) the choices made for price and production. We propose
that at each time step firm i updates its wage as:
WTi (t+ 1) = Wi(t)[1 + γw(1− ΓΦi)εξ′i(t)] if
{
Yi(t) < Di(t)
Pi(t) > 0
Wi(t+ 1) = Wi(t)[1− γw(1 + ΓΦi)uξ′i(t)] if
{
Yi(t) > Di(t)
Pi(t) < 0
(A11)
where γw is a certain parameter, Pi(t) is the profit of the firm at time t and ξ′i(t) an independent U [0, 1]
random variable. If WTi (t+ 1) is such that the profit of firm i at time t with this amount of wages would
have been negative, Wi(t + 1) is chosen to be exactly at the equilibrium point where Pi(t) = 0 otherwise
Wi(t+ 1) = W
T
i (t+ 1).
The above rules are intuitive: if a firm makes a profit and it has a large demand for its good, it will
increase the pay of its workers. The pay rise is expected to be large if the firm is financially healthy and/or
8 A higher wage translates in the availability of a larger share of unemployed workers in the hiring process.
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if unemployment is low (i.e. if ε is large) because pressure on salaries is high. Conversely, if the firm makes
a loss and has a low demand for its good, it will reduce the wages. This reduction is drastic if the company
is close to bankruptcy, and/or if unemployment is high, because the pressure on salaries is then low. In all
other cases, wages are not updated.
The parameters γp,w allow us to simulate different price/wage update timescales, i.e. the aggressivity with
which firms react a change of their economic conditions. In the following we set γp = 0.05 and γw = γp.
The case γw = 0 corresponds to removing completely the wage update rule, such that the version of the
model with constant wage is recovered.
• After prices, productions and wages are set and interests paid, consumption and accounting take place. Since
each firm has total sales pi min {Yi, Di} firms profits are
Pi(t) = pi(t) min {Yi(t), Di(t)} −Wi(t)Yi(t) + ρd max {Ei(t), 0}+ ρ` min {Ei(t), 0} . (A12)
When firms have both positive Ei and Pi dividends are paid as a fraction δ of the firm cash balance Ei. The
update rule for firms cash balance is therefore
Ei(t+ 1) = Ei(t) + Pi(t)− δEi(t)θ(Pi(t))θ(Ei(t)) (A13)
where θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, households savings are updated as
S(t+ 1) = S(t) +
∑
i
Wi(t)Yi(t)−
∑
i
pi(t) min {Yi(t), Di(t)}+ δ
∑
i
Ei(t)θ(Pi(t))θ(Ei(t)). (A14)
The dividends share δ is set to 2% unless stated otherwise and the ∆(t) term in Eq. (A5) is given by
∆(t) = δ
∑
i
Ei(t)θ(Pi(t))θ(Ei(t)) (A15)
• Finally, an inactive firm has a finite probability ϕ (which we set to 0.1) per unit time to get revived; when
it does so its price is fixed to pi(t) = p(t), its wage to wi(t) = w(t), its workforce is the available workforce
Yi(t) = µu(t) and its cash-balance is the amount needed to pay the wage bill Ei(t) = Wi(t)Yi(t). This small
’liquidity’ is provided by firms with positive Ei in shares proportional to their wealth Ei.
Appendix B: Firms’ adaptive behavior leads to a second order phase transition
We start by analysing the effect of adaptation of firms. In order to get a first insight it is useful to consider a
simplified setting where Γ = Γ0 (i.e. αΓ = 0), ρ
`(t) = ρ0(t) = 0, f = 1, c(t) = c0 = 0.5 (hence αc = 0) and wages are
constant and equal to 1 (γw = 0). In this case the basic model described in [1] (with constant wages) is recovered.
Intuitively, the coupling between financial fragility and hiring/firing propensity should have a stabilizing effect on
the economy. Moreover, the full unemployment phase at R < Rc is deeply affected by the presence of αΓ: for αΓ 6= 0
the unemployment rate in this phase is no longer one, but becomes smaller than one and continuously changing with
R. In order to derive an estimate of these continuous values we use an intuitive argument (at Θ = ∞) which is
justified a posteriori by the good match with numerical results. Given the critical ratio R = η0+/η
0
− = Rc separating
the high/low unemployment phases when there is no adaptation (i.e. Γ0 = 0) one can expect that equilibrium values
of the unemployment rate different from 0 and 1 can only be stable if ηi+/η
i
− remains around the critical value Rc at
Γ0 = 0. Near criticality therefore we enforce that:
ηi+
ηi−
=
η0+(1− Γ0Φi)
η0−(1 + Γ0Φi)
= Rc ⇒ −Γ0Φ ≈
Rcη
0
− − η0+
Rcη0− + η0+
. (B1)
An explicit form of Φ in terms of the employment rate ε = Y can be obtained with the additional assumption that
the system is always close to equilibrium (i.e. p ≈ 1 and D ≈ Y , at least when ηi+/ηi− ∼ Rc), which allows one
to express households savings in terms of the firms’ production. Indeed (see the discussion in [1]) at equilibrium
W = B = NFY = c(W +S), from which it follows that NFY = W = Sc/(1− c). For c = 0.5 as in our simulations one
thus has S = NFY . Since the total amount of money is conserved (in our simulations NFE + S = NFE +NFY = NF,
see Appendix C) one finally obtains that L = 1− Y and Φ = (Y − 1)/Y = (ε− 1)/ε, hence
Γ0
ε
=
Rcη
0
− − η0+
Rcη0− + η0+
+ Γ0 =
Rc −R
Rc +R
+ Γ0 . (B2)
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FIG. 9: Inverse of the average employment rate Γ0/ε as a function of the ratio R = η
0
+/η
0
− with η
0
− = 0.1 and γ = 0.01 when
Γ0 > 0. When the employment rate is rescaled with the parameter Γ0 (here Γ0 = 10
−3, 10−4) the different lines collapse
and Eq. (B2) agrees with numerical simulations. In the inset we also plot the rescaled variance, still as a function of η0+.
Approaching the critical point the variance of the unemployment fluctuations diverges, together with their relaxation time
going to infinity. The other parameters are: δ = 0.02, Θ = 5, γw = 0, c = 0.5, β = 0 and ϕ = 0.1
Note that according to this formula the employment goes to ε = 1 at the critical point R = Rc. Above this value,
the economy is in the “good” state and employment sticks to ε = 1 (this is because in the argument the effect of Θ
has been neglected). Moreover, when R = Rc, ε is proportional to Γ0 and therefore in the limit Γ0 → 0 one has ε = 0
for all R < Rc. This is the “bad” phase of full unemployment at Γ0 = 0, which becomes in this case a phase where
employment grows steadily but remains of order Γ0 except very close to the critical point.
Eq. (B2) is plotted in Fig. 9 together with numerical results. Note that in this case the representative firm
approximation (NF = 1) is in good agreement with numerical results also for NF = 10, 000, as it was for the
discontinuous transition obtained for Γ = 0. In the inset of Fig. 9 one can see that the variance of the fluctuations of
employment rate is diverging as long as the critical value of R is approached. This is confirmed by a spectral analysis
of the unemployment time series (see Fig. 10). In order to obtain the power spectrum we apply the GSL Fast Fourier
Transform algorithm to the time series ε(t)− 〈ε〉. As one can see in Fig. 10 the power spectrum is well approximated
by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck form:
I(ω) = I0
ω20
ω20 + ω
2
(B3)
with ω0 going linearly to 0 when η
0
+ approaches its critical value, meaning that the relaxation time ω
−1
0 diverges as
one approaches the critical point. Note that this is not the case for the Mark 0 model with Γ0 = 0 which instead has
a white noise power spectrum even in proximity of the transition line. The first order (discontinuous) transition for
Γ0 = 0,Θ = ∞ is thus replaced by a second order (continuous) transition when the firms adapt their behavior as a
function of their financial fragility.
Finally, note that the presence of a continuum of states for the unemployment rate whenever Γ0 > 0 and R < Rc
holds also with γw > 0 (when wages are not constant). It was however simpler to perform analytical computations
with constant wages.
Appendix C: Pseudo-code of Mark 0
We present here the pseudo-code for the Mark 0 code described in Sec. II B and Appendix A. The source code of
the baseline Mark-0 is available on demand.
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FIG. 10: Logarithm of the normalized power spectrum for Mark 0 with adaptive firms (Γ0 = 10
−3), γp = 0.05 and NF = 1
(left) and NF = 1000 (right). The other parameters are set as in Fig. 9. The main plot shows two examples of the spectrum for
η0− = 0.1 and η
0
+ = 0.05 (black line) and η
0
+ = 0.09 (red line) in the left plot, η
0
+ = 0.05 (black line) and η
0
+ = 0.08 (red line) in
the right plot. The time series is made of 228 time steps after Teq = 500 000 and the logarithm of the spectrum is averaged over
a moving window of 100 points for a better visualization. With both system sizes the fit with Eq. (B3) (blue dashed lines) is
good with the only difference that when NF > 1 a clear oscillatory pattern appears at high frequencies, that becomes sharper
and sharper as NF increases. In the inset of each figure we plot the value of ω0 in Eq. (B3) obtained from the fit as a function
of the ratio R = η0+/η
0
−. In both cases ω0 goes linearly to 0 as the critical value is approached.
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Algorithm 1 Mark 0
Require: NF Number of firms; c0, β, γp, γw, η
0
+, η
0
−, δ,Θ, ϕ, f, αc, φpi, φε, αΓ,Γ0, ε
∗, pi∗, ρ∗, ω; T total evolution time;
. Initialization
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
W [i]← 1
p[i]← 1 + 0.2(random− 0.5)
Y [i]← [1 + 0.2(random− 0.5)]/2
D[i]← 0.5 . Initial employment is 0.5
E [i]←W [i]Y [i] random
P[i]← p[i] min(D[i], Y [i])−W [i]Y [i]
a[i]← 1 . binary variable: active (1) / inactive (0) firm
end for
S ← NF −∑i E [i] . Main loop
for (t← 1; t ≤ T ; t← t+ 1) do
ε← 1
NF
∑
i Y [i]
u← 1− ε
p←
∑
i p[i]Y [i]∑
i Y [i]
w ←
∑
iW [i]Y [i]∑
i Y [i]
u∗[i]← exp(βW [i]/w)∑
i a[i] exp(βW [i]/w)
NFu
x˜← ωx+ (1− ω)x˜ where x are pi, ρd, ρ`, u . Central Bank policy
εˆ∗ ← min (ε∗, 1.025ε˜)
ρ0 ← ρ∗ + 10φpi(p˜i − pi∗) + φε log (ε˜/εˆ∗)
ρ0 ← max (ρ0, 0)
Γ← max {αΓ(ρ˜` − pi),Γ0}
D ← E− ← E+ ← 0 . Firms update prices, productions and wages
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
if a[i] == 1 then
if E [i] > −ΘW [i]Y [i] then
E+ ← E+ + max {E [i], 0}
E− ← E− −min {E [i], 0}
Φ[i]← − E[i]
W [i]Y [i]
Φ[i]← min {Φ[i], 1/Γ}
Φ[i]← max {Φ[i],−1/Γ}
η+ ← η0+(1− ΓΦ[i])
η− ← η0−(1 + ΓΦ[i])
if Y [i] < D[i] then
if P[i] > 0 then
W [i]←W [i][1 + γw(1− ΓΦ[i])ε random]
W [i]← min {W [i], (P [i] min [D[i], Y [i]] + ρd max {E [i], 0}+ ρ` min {E [i], 0})/Y [i]}
end if
Y [i]← Y [i] + min{η+(D[i]− Y [i]), u∗[i]}
if p[i] < p then p[i]← p[i](1 + γp random)
end if
else if Y [i] > D[i] then
if P[i] < 0 then
W [i]←W [i][1− γw(1 + ΓΦ[i])u random]
end if
Y [i]← max{0, Y [i]− η−(D[i]− Y [i])}
if p[i] < p then p[i]← p[i](1− γp random)
end if
end if
else if E [i] ≤ −ΘW [i]Y [i] then
a[i]← 0
D ← D − E [i]
end if
end if
end for
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Algorithm 2 Mark0 (continued)
u← 1− 1
NF
∑
i Y [i] . Update u and p
p←
∑
i p[i]Y [i]∑
i Y [i]
. Private bank sets interest rates
ρ` = ρ0 + (1− f)D/E−
ρd = ρ
`E−−D
S+E+
. Households decide the demand
S ← (1 + ρd)S +∑iW [i]Y [i]
c← c0[1 + αc(pi − ρ˜d)/γpi]
CB ← cS
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
D[i]← CBa[i] exp(−βp[i]/p)
p[i]
∑
i a[i] exp(−βp[i]/p) . Inactive firms have no demand
end for
. Accounting
E+ ← 0
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
if a[i] == 1 then
S ← S − p[i] min{Y [i], D[i]}
P[i]← p[i] min{Y [i], D[i]} −W [i]Y [i] + ρd max {E [i], 0}+ ρ` min {E [i], 0}
E [i]← E [i] + P[i]
if P[i] > 0 && E [i] > 0 then . Pay dividends
S ← S + δ E [i]
E [i]← E [i]− δ E [i]
end if
E+ ← E+ + max {E [i], 0}
end if
end for
. Revivals
R ← 0
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
if a[i] == 0 then
if random < ϕ then
Y [i]← u random
a[i]← 1
P [i]← p
W [i]← w
E [i]←W [i]Y [i]
R← R+ E [i]
E+ ← E+ + max {E [i], 0}
end if
end if
end for
for (i← 0; i < NF; i← i+ 1) do
if a[i] == 1 then
if E [i] > 0 then
E [i]← E [i]−RE [i]/E+
end if
end if
end for
end for
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